Zoning by Initiative in California: A Critical Analysis by Hile, Gregory A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-1979
Zoning by Initiative in California: A Critical
Analysis
Gregory A. Hile
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory A. Hile, Zoning by Initiative in California: A Critical Analysis, 12 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 903 (1979).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol12/iss4/5
ZONING BY INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of a zoning ordinance is no simple matter. California
statutes governing the enactment of zoning ordinances' require a com-
plex scheme of hearings, study, recommendations and further hearings
before a proposed ordinance can be approved. The statutes require
that the zoning ordinance be consistent with governmental land use
planning goals2 and further mandate careful consideration of the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed ordinance.3
'While the practical considerations of an expanding population long
ago necessitated abandonment of "town meeting" decisionmaking4 in
favor of representative government, the power of the initiative5 is re-
served to the people by the constitutions of many states.6 The Califor-
nia statutes regulating the initiative procedure require only that a
specified number of signatures be obtained on a petition, that the pro-
posed measure be placed on the ballot and that it be voted on in the
same manner as are political candidates seeking elective office.
7
Occasionally zoning ordinances are enacted by initiative. Zoning by
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65800-65912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as "State Zoning Law"].
2. Id. § 65860.
3. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21080(a) (West Supp. 1979).
4. The "town meeting" tradition is not completely dead. See Bryan, Town Meeting Gov-
ernment Still Supported in Vermont, 61 NAT'L Civic REv. 348 (1972).
5. An initiative is defined as "[t]he power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to
enact or reject them at the polls, independent of legislative assembly." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 923 (4th rev. ed. 1968). An initiative is distinguishable from a referendum, which
is defined as "the right to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body, and which, in most cases, would without action on the part of the electorate
become law." Id. at 1446.
6. In California, as in most states, the right of initiative is reserved to the people. CAL.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1 states: "The legislative power of this State is vested in the California
Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves
thepowers of initiative andreferendum." (emphasis added). See also ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt.
I, § I; MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 9. In a few states the right of initiative is conferred only by
statute, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 89.610 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 40-12 (1968).
The courts generally have adopted a liberal policy of protecting these reserved rights. See
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 477,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976); Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 328, 431 P.2d 650, 652, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 26, 28 (1967).
7. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3500-5162 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
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initiative has been challenged on both constitutional8 and statutory9
grounds. The constitutional argument is that potentially aggrieved
property owners have a fourteenth amendment right to procedural due
process'0 before an ordinance is enacted that substantially affects the
use of their property. Zoning by initiative arguably denies the property
owners this right because hearings are not a part of the initiative proce-
dure. The statutory argument is that the statutes regulating zoning and
initiative procedures conflict, and that since the zoning statutes are a
more specific legislation than the initiative statutes, the conflict must be
resolved in favor of the zoning procedure."1
Recently, the California Supreme Court had occasion to review these
constitutional and statutory objections to zoning by initiative.' 2 It re-
jected both. This comment first examines the statutory objectionto
zoning by initiative and considers whether zoning by initiative is ac-
complished at a cost to other important public objectives, namely, land
use planning and environmental protection. Second, the constitutional
objection that zoning by initiative deprives affected property owners of
the protections of due process of law is explored. Also examined is the
anomaly that arises from permitting land use control to be accom-
plished by two radically different procedures. Finally, a new decision
of the California Supreme Court' 3 that may affect the court's future
8. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 439 P.2d 290 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1968) (landown-
ers seeking to enjoin rezoning of residential parcels denied relief because Arizona cities have
power to refer an ordinance for election); Bell v. Studdard, 141 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
1965) (ordinance "was in contravention to the constitutional requirements of due process"
because it failed to provide notice and hearing).
9. E.g., Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 516 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Nev. Sup. Ct.
1973) (state zoning and land use laws are an inherent power of state and are not subject to
initiative or ordinance); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 277 P.2d 805, 809 (Utah Sup.
Ct. 1954) ("when appellants seek to initiate rezoning within the city without complying with
the zoning statute, they are, in effect, attacking collaterally the very statute under which they
claim their power to zone ... [and] the appellant may not attack the validity of the stat-
ute").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; "No State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
11. It is a general rule of construction that a statute having special or specific application
controls over a general one, without regard to date of passage. People v. Gilbert, I Cal. 3d
475, 479, 462 P.2d 580, 581, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1969); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3534 (West
1970) states: "Particular expressions qualify those which are general."
12. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (statutory challenge); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S.
901 (1976) (constitutional challenge). Decided at the same time as San Diego was Builders
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974) (constitu-
tional challenge).
13. Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979).
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decisions on zoning by initiative is discussed.
II. THE HURST DOCTRINE, LIVERMORE AND
ZONING BY INITIATIVE
A. Hurst v. City of Burlingame
In order to understand the suggested conflict between the procedures
of zoning by statute and by initiative, the California Supreme Court
decision in Hurst v. City of Burlingame14 must be examined. This semi-
nal case is the starting point for analyzing later zoning by initiative
decisions. In Hurst a property owner in Burlingame sought to enjoin
the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning ordinance that had been
enacted by initiative, alleging that the city had not complied with the
requirements of the California Zoning Act of 1917.' The specific vio-
lation alleged was that the city failed to hold a noticed hearing before
enacting the ordinance. The supreme court struck down the ordinance
using the following logic: 6 (1) The statutory zoning scheme is the only
measure of the city council's power to zone; (2) the initiative procedure
is "hopelessly inconsistent and in conflict [with the zoning scheme] as
to the manner of the preparation and adoption of a zoning ordi-
nance"; 17 (3) "the Zoning Act is a special statute dealing with a partic-
ular subject and must be deemed to be controlling over the initiative,
which is general in its scope";' 8 and (4) therefore, the City of Burlin-
game could not enact a zoning ordinance unless it complied with the
Zoning Act.
B. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore
Although the Hurst doctrine was reaffirmed in California 9 and
adopted in other states, 20 many commentators questioned its continued
validity in zoning by initiative cases.2 ' Finally, in Associated Home
14. 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929).
15. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 734, at 1419. The current State Zoning Law is found at CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 65800-65912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978).
16. 207 Cal. at 138, 277 P. at 310.
17. Id. at 151, 277 P. at 311.
18. Id.
19. Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973); People's
Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973); Laguna
Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960).
20. See note 9 supra.
21. Higginbotham, Zoning by Initiative: A Needfor Consistency, 10:6 BEVERLY HILLS B.J.
11 (1976); Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74
(1976) [hereinafter cited as The Initiative]; Comment, Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy Local
19791
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Builders v. City of Livermore,22 the California Supreme Court decided
it was time for a "long-needed reconsideration of the actual holding of
Hurst"23 that the statutory conflict is "hopeless" and for a re-examina-
tion of the court's previous resolution of the conflict.
The zoning ordinance in issue in Livermore prohibited the issuance
of further residential building permits until such time as local educa-
tional, sewage disposal, and water supply facilities complied with cer-
tain specific standards.24 The trial court and the court of appeal had
followed Hurst in striking down the ordinance, but the supreme court
reversed.25
Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner26 held there was no con-
flict between zoning by initiative and the State Zoning Law because the
state legislature had never intended the notice and hearing require-
ments of the State Zoning Law to apply to the enactment of zoning
initiatives. The requirements were "plainly" drafted only with a view
to ordinances adopted by local legislative bodies.' The court reasoned
that the State Zoning Law merely adds certain procedures to those re-
quired for enactment of ordinances in general.28
The court noted that Hurst had been treated as a case involving a
conflict between two statutes of equal importance. The Livermore
court found that this treatment was wrong because it overlooked a cru-
cial point: although the procedure for exercising the right of initiative
is spelled out by statute,29 the right itself is guaranteed by the state
constitution. 30 The court further noted that conflicting statutes should
be reconciled when possible,31 that statutes should be construed so as to
Electorates: A Valid Approach in Caifornia?, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 105 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Zoning by Initiative].
22. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
23. Id. at 593, 557 P.2d at 478-79, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47.
24. For a history of the events leading up to the Livermore ordinance, see M. CRANSTON,
B. GARTH, R. PLATTNER, & J. VARON, A HANDBOOK FOR CONTROLLING LOCAL GROWTH
90-96 (1973); Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study ofSan Jose and Livermore,
Calf/ornia, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch].
25. Another important issue in Livermore was the substantive issue of exclusionary zon-
ing. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the impact and dura-
tion of the ordinance's restrictions. 18 Cal. 3d at 611, 557 P.2d at 490, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
26. For a discussion of Justice Tobriner's opinions in real property cases, see Adler &
Mosk, Justice Tobriner & Real Property, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1977).
27. 18 Cal. 3d at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
28. Id.
29. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3500-5162 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
30. 18 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (referring to CAL. CONST.
art. IV, § 1). See note 6 supra.
31. Id. at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48, citing Warne v. Harkness, 60 Cal. 2d
579, 588, 387 P.2d 377, 382, 35 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1963).
[Vol. 12
ZONING BY INITIA TIVE
avoid constitutional questions, 32 and that the initiative provisions must
be broadly construed in favor of the initiative.33 On these grounds the
court overruled Hurst and held that general law cities34 may zone by
initiative.
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the Hurst doctrine remains
compelling.35 He stated that "[t]he zoning laws establish an adminis-
trative process which must be followed prior to the legislative act of
adopting an ordinance. '36 The initiative statutes, noted Justice Clark,
do not permit the administrative functions of the State Zoning Law to
be carried out,37 and this conflict must be resolved by the familiar rule
of statutory construction that the specific governs the general when
there is a conflict.
38
C. Analysis and Effect of the Livermore Decision
The Livermore decision raises a number of questions. First, it is not
exactly clear whether the basic premise of Hurst - that the electorate's
power of initiative is no greater than that of the legislative body - was,
32. 18 Cal. 3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48, citing In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930,
942, 464 P.2d 142, 150, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686, 694 (1970).
33. 18 Cal. 3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
34. There are two types of cities in California. A general law city is organized under, and
is subject to, the general law of the state in all matters. CAL. CONST. art. X1, § 7; CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 34100-45345 (West 1968 and Supp. 1979) (Municipal Corporations Act). A charter
city adopts its own charter, which takes precedence over the general law in areas of purely
municipal concern. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3-6. Thus, the State Zoning Law (or the previ-
ous 1917 Zoning Act) applies in general law cities but, being a matter of purely municipal
concern, does not apply in charter cities.
The city is free, of course, to adopt the provisions of the State Zoning Law if it chooses.
One of the issues in San Diego, for example, concerned the effect of a section of the San
Diego City Charter, which provides that the city planning commission be organized under,
and have such powers and duties as prescribed by state law. See notes 106-08 infra and
accompanying text.
While the majority of cities in California are general law, substantially all of the larger
cities are governed by charter. For a list of the cities and their type, see D. HAGMAN, J.
LARSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE 535-39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
HAGMAN].
For a discussion of one of the problems with the municipal affairs doctrine in the area of
land use control, see Comment, Land Use Control, Externalities, and the MunicpalAffairs
Doctrine- 4 Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 432 (1975).
35. 18 Cal. 3d at 611, 557 P.2d at 490, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
36. Id. at 615, 557 P.2d at 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (Clark, J., dissenting).
37. Id. Justice Clark also pointed out that the majority did not address the potential
conflicts between the requirement of conformity with a general plan and zoning by initia-
tive, as well as the substantive question of whether the Livermore ordinance violated CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65858 (West 1977) regarding interim ordinances. Id. at n.4.
38. See note 11 supra.
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in fact, overruled. In Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach,39 a decision
handed down just three months before Livermore, the supreme court,
citing Hurst, stated: "It has long been settled that a city ordinance pro-
posed by initiative 'must constitute such legislation as the legislative
body of such. . . city has the power to enact under the law granting,
defining and limiting the powers of such body'."4 Bagley, coupled
with the indirect approach of the Livermore majority in dealing with
Hurst4 and the fact that Livermore overruled only zoning by initiative
cases,a' lends credence to the idea that the Hurst doctrine remains via-
ble law. If this is so, the Hurst doctrine requires a different result than
that reached in Livermore, for the State Zoning Law clearly requires
local legislative bodies to comply with the Zoning Law provisions.43
Another issue concerns Livermore's treatment of the legislative intent
of the zoning statutes.44 No mention is made of Government Code sec-
tions 65802 or 65804. Section 6580245 provides that no statute outside
the State Zoning Law shall restrict or limit the procedures provided by
the Zoning Law. Section 65804 provides in part:
It shall be the purpose of this sectioa to implement minimum procedural
39. 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976).
40. Id. at 26, 553 P.2d at 1143, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (quoting Hurst v. City of Burlingame,
207 Cal. 134, 140, 277 P.2d 308, 311 (1929)).
41. See text accompanying notes 29-43 supra and infra.
42. The court only overruled those cases holding that general law cities cannot zone by
initiative, including Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973);
People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973);
Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1960); Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958).
No mention was made in Livermore of the line of cases upholding the Hurst rule that the
initiative may be used to enact only such legislation as the legislative body has the power to
enact. See, e.g., Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 668 (1976); Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 270 P.2d 481 (1954); Galvin v. Board of
Supervisors, 195 Cal. 686, 235 P. 450 (1925).
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65802, 65804 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978).
44. The only authority regarding intent cited by the court (The Initiative, note 21 supra, at
104-05) does not fully support the court's conclusion. The comment argues that "the pres-
ence of procedural safeguards in zoning enabling acts ought not to be interpreted as showing
a state legislative intent to bar use of the initiative in zoning." Id. at 105. This does not
necessarily mean the legislature never intended the safeguards to apply to initiative action.
Cf. Zoning by Initiative, note 21 supra, at I11 n.48, which states:
The Zoning Act was probably drafted with no thought to the initiative and referendum,
but rather only with the purpose of spelling out local power. The original Zoning Act
was enacted only five years after the creation of initiative and referendum, when their
tradition and importance in California politics was not yet established.
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65802 (West 1966) provides in pertinent part: "[n]o provision of
this code, other than the provisions of this chapter, and no provisions of any other code or
statute shall restrict or limit the procedures provided in this chapter. . . of any zoning law,
ordinance, rule or regulation."
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standards for the conduct of city and county zoning hearings. Further, it
is the intent of the Legislature that this section provide such standards to
insure uniformity of, and public access to, zoning and planning hearings
while maintaining the maximum control of cities and counties over zon-
46ing matters ....
Moreover, section 65804 is expressly applicable to all cities and coun-
ties in California, regardless of whether they are charter or general law.
These provisions seem to indicate a legislative intent to require compli-
ance with the minimum standards set down in the State Zoning Law in
all zoning matters.
Third, in its resolution of the supposed conflict inherent in zoning by
initiative, the Livermore court distinguished the California Supreme
Court decision in Galvin v. Board of Supervisors7 on the basis of the
exceptional nature of the statute involved in Galvin." The statute in
issue in Galvin permitted one county to legislate on a matter that other-
wise required joint action of the state and all counties affected, but it
permitted such action only if .the legislating county complied with re-
quirements designed to protect the interests of the state and the other
counties.49 The court held that the defendant county could not circum-
vent that statutory requirement by use of the initiative. However, there
is no basis for distinguishing Galvin, because closer examination of the
State Zoning Law reveals identical attributes. Further, in Scott v. City
of Indian Wells,50 a unanimous California Supreme Court held that
non-residents of a city, whose properties are affected by a proposed
zoning ordinance within the city, are entitled to the same rights under
the State Zoning Law as are residents and have judicial standing to
enforce those rights.51 While the State Zoning Law does protect the
interests of such non-residents, the initiative process, by its very nature,
cannot; non-residents of the political entity cannot sign the petitions to
place the proposed measure on the ballot52 and, of course, are not enti-
tled to vote on it.
53
Finally, in declaring that the status of the zoning and initiative stat-
utes are not equal,54 the majority in Livermore implied that the power
46. Id. § 65804 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
47. 195 Cal. 686, 235 P. 450 (1925).
48. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 594 n.l 1, 557
P.2d 473, 479 n.ll, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56 n.ll.
49. Id. at 694-96, 235 P. at 452-54.
50. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1973).
51. Id. at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
52. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4005 (West 1977).
53. Id. § 100.
54. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
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to zone is merely statutory. The zoning power in California, however,
is derived not from the State Zoning Law, but from article XI, section 7
of the California Constitution, which states: "A county or city may
make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws. ' 5 Since
zoning is an exercise of the police power,5 6 it appears that there is still a
conflict between zoning through representative government and the ini-
tiative process, but it is one of constitutional, rather than statutory, na-
ture. Thus, the "crucial" distinction found in Livermore appears to be
no distinction at all.
The clear problem with Livermore is, as Justice Clark stated in his
dissent, that zoning by initiative fails to give effect to the extensive
scheme of planning and environmental protection that presently exists.
As Justice Clark lamented:
It is ironic that today's decision, reviewing a "no-growth" ordinance, may
provide a loophole for developers to avoid the numerous procedures es-
tablished by the Legislature which in recent years have made real estate
development so difficult. Seeking approval of planned unit develop-
ments, land developers with the aid of the building trade unions should
have little difficulty in securing the requisite signatures for an initiative
ordinance. Because of today's holding that the initiative takes precedence
over zoning laws, the legislative scheme of notice, hearings, agency con-
sideration reports, findings, and modifications can be bypassed, and the
city council may immediately adopt the planned unit development.5 7
It is important to realize just what is endangered. In 1909, land use
control in Los Angeles consisted of a "comprehensive" zoning plan of a
single residential and seven industrial districts.5 8 There were no gen-
eral plans or environmental impact reports, and the Coastal Commis-
sion did not exist. But since those days, land use regulation has
developed into a pervasive and complex body of law and regulation. 9
55. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
56. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926); Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 502-03, 234 P. 388, 391 (1925), a 'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Miller v.
Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 483, 234 P. 381, 382-83 (1925).
57. 18 Cal. 3d at 615, 557 P.2d at 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (Clark, J., dissenting).
58. Exparte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 222, 118 P. 714, 715 (1911).
59. Some authors oppose the use of zoning for land use control and argue that Houston,
Texas achieves effective land use control through economic dictates and the use of private
restrictive covenants, without the use of zoning regulation. B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT
ZONING 23-76 (1973). Bernard Siegan describes zoning as
unworkable, inequitable and a serious impediment to the operation of the real estate
market and the satisfaction of its customers.
It is absurd and tragic that the national goals of stimulating more and better housing
and a desirable housing environment are being frustrated by local goals of limited
[Vol. 12
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Both federal and state government is involved in California land use
planning. At the federal level, "virtually every federal loan or grant-in-
aid program affecting the physical development of a locality requires
land-use planning by the recipient of federal help. ' 60 At the state level,
the Legislature declared its intent to protect and preserve California's
land resources.6' This intent is carried out by the Office of Planning
and Research which is responsible for comprehensive state planning,
coordination of state agency planning,62 and assisting local and re-
gional planning.63
Regional planning is also of growing importance.64 Each California
county has a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO),65 which
has broad control over the incorporation of new cities and over the
housing. It is equally inexcusable that federal policies to encourage business and devel-
opment and competition are being impeded by local policies that operate to discourage
them.
Id. at 247. Another commentator has suggested an alternate, middle-ground approach:
I do not recommend either uncontrolled use of property or regulated stultification. Nor
is it urged here that resources which are needed for the general public welfare should
not be regulated to that end. What is urged is that "the public" take a long, hard look
at what its needs are, assess all the costs involved, and proceed accordingly. If "the
public" wants land uses (or non-uses) which benefit "the public" generally, then "the
public" should buy the property, or an appropriate interest in the property, rather than
attempt to force individual property owners to devote their property to public use with-
out compensation.
Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed
Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
253, 257 (1975) (emphasis in original).
60. HAGMAN, supra note 34, at § 2.1. For a discussion of such federal programs and their
planning requirements, see id. at §§ 2.1-.7.
61. With regard to planning, the Legislature has stated:
The Legislature finds and declares that California's land is an exhaustible resource, not
just a commodity, and is essential to the economy, environment and general well-being
of the people of California. It is the policy of the state and the intent of the Legislature
to protect California's land resource, to insure its preservation, and use in ways which
are economically and socially desirable in an attempt to improve the quality of life in
California.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65030 (West Supp. 1979).
62. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 50000-50153 (West Supp. 1979) (housing
plans); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5099-5099.12 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979) (outdoor recreation
plans).
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 63035 (West Supp. 1966-1978). For organization, goals and
function of the Office of Planning and Research, see id. §§ 65025-65049.
64. See Marks & Taber, Prospectsfor Regional Planning in Caifornia, 4 PAC. L.J. 117
(1973); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607-08, 557
P.2d 473, 503, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 71 (1976); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548,
492 P.2d 1137, 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1973) ("To hold. . . that defendant city may
zone the land within its border without any concern for adjacent landowners would indeed
'make a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of
zoning.' ").
65. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54773-54799.5 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978).
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annexation of additional territory to existing cities. Each commission
has general planning powers as well. Special planning legislation has
also been enacted to regulate the use of particular areas of concern,
such as the San Francisco Bay,66 Lake Tahoe67 and the Santa Monica
Mountains. 8 Moreover, cities and counties in contiguous areas may
form an area planning commission by a resolution of the interested
political subdivisions.69
Most land use planning occurs at the local level. Each city and
county is required by the legislature to adopt a comprehensive, long-
term, general plan.7° The general plan consists of a statement of devel-
opment policies, including diagrams and text setting forth "objectives,
principles, standards, and plan proposals,"7' in certain required subject
elements. The plan has many functions, 72 including serving as: (a) a
source of information, (b) a program for correction, (c) an estimate of
the future, (d) an indicator of goals, (e) a technique for coordination,
and (f) a device for stimulating public interest and responsibility. In
short, the general plan is "a constitution for all future developments.
73
Clearly, adoption of a general plan is not just an idle function. Each
planning commission's recommendation on a proposed zoning ordi-
nance must specify how the ordinance relates to and is consistent with
74
the general plan.71 Moreover, local governments may not acquire, dis-
pose of, or develop real property unless such action will conform to the
general plan.76
In addition to the planning measures, the California Legislature has
enacted a wide variety of environmental protection statutes that pro-
vide for specific77 and generalized7" types of environmental protection.
66. Id. §§ 66600-66661.
67. Id. §§ 66800-67130.
68. Id. §§ 67450-67488.
69. Id. § 65601. See id. §§ 65600-65604.
70. Id. § 65300.
71. Id. § 65302.
72. HAGMAN, supra note 34, at § 2.23.
73. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1965).
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
75. Id. § 65855.
76. Id. § 65402.
77. See, e.g., Z'berg-Kapiloff Solid Waste Control Act of 1976, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 66795-66796.82 (West Supp. 1966-1978); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-43835
(West Supp. 1979) (air pollution); California Noise Control Act of 1973, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 46000-46080 (West Supp. 1979); Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control
Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13998 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979).
78. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-66661 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978) (creating
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission); Suisun Marsh Preserva-
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One such statute is the California Environmental Quality Act of
1970 (CEQA).7 9 Although there are certain enumerated exceptions,80
the CEQA generally applies to all proposed discretionary projects to be
carried out or approved by public agencies. These projects include the
enactment or amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of vari-
ances and conditional use permits, and the approval of certain tentative
subdivision maps."1
The key to environmental protection under CEQA is the preparation
of an environmental impact report (EIR),82 which is an "informational
document" designed to: (1) provide public agencies and the general
public with detailed information about the environmental effect of a
proposed project, (2) list ways in which the significant effects of the
project might be minimized, and (3) indicate alternatives to the pro-
ject.8 3 Whenever an EIR is required, it must be reviewed by the appro-
priate public agencies before a project is approved or disapproved.84
Another important environmental protection measure is the Califor-
nia Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act).8 The Coastal Act is a direct
outgrowth of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972,86 a
measure enacted by state-wide initiative, and which by its own terms was
repealed on January 1, 1977.87 The 1976 Coastal Act created six re-
gional coastal commissions to govern land use in each zone's respective
regions and a state-wide commission with authority over the regional
commissions. 8 Each regional commission has the power to approve or
reject coastal zoning ordinances submitted to them by local govern-
ments.89 Each commission also requires those who wish to develop
land within the zone to obtain a coastal development permit.90
tion Act of 1977, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 29000-29612 (West Supp. 1979); California
Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West Supp. 1979).
79. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979).
80. Id. § 21080.5. CEQA does not apply to ministerial projects or emergency actions, id.
§ 21080(b), or to certain special regulatory programs. Id. § 21080.5.
81. Id. § 21080(a).
82. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 75, 529 P.2d 66, 70, 118 Cal. Rptr.
34, 38 (1974).
83. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21061, 21100 (West Supp. 1978).
84. Id. § 21061. In the event it is determined that a proposed project does not have a
significant environmental effect, a negative declaration to that effect is adopted. Id.
§ 21080(c).
85. Id. §§ 30000-30900.
86. Id. §§ 27000-27650 (repealed by statute Jan. 1, 1977).
87. Id. § 27650.
88. Id. §§ 30300-30342 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). The regional commissions consist of
members from local government and from the general public. Id. § 30302.
89. Id. § 30513.
90. Id. §§ 30600, 30601.
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Although Livermore held that the legislature did not intend the State
Zoning Law to be applied to initiative actions,91 planning and environ-
mental protection laws should be so applied. The legislature has stated
that the policy of the state on environmental protection is to "[e]nsure
that the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding
criterion in public decisions. ' 92
The courts have construed environmental measures liberally,93 in or-
der to afford the environment the fullest possible protection within the
reasonable scope of the statutory language.94 In Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors9l the California Supreme Court held that the leg-
islature intended CEQA to apply to all private activity in which a gov-
ernmental permit (e.g., building permits) or other entitlement is
necessary.96 In No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,97 the supreme court
held that an EIR must be prepared whenever it can be fairly argued
that a particular project may have a significant environmental impact.
The court also noted that compliance with CEQA after the enactment
of a zoning ordinance is similar to apost hoc rationalization of a deci-
sion already made, and is not sufficient.9"
Finally, in light of the pervasiveness and scope of land planning and
91. See tcxt accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
92. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West 1977).
93. Michael Berger, a noted expert in land use matters, has written that the Coastal Com-
mission has succeeded as a respondent at an 85.7% rate, and as an appellant at an 88.9% rate.
Amazed by this success rate, Berger writes:
Examine that last statistic slowly. Taste it, as you roll it around on your tongue. Try
to say it with a straight face. Nearly nine times out often, the Coast Commission succeeds
in reversing a trial judge. Not even in wildly ecstatic fantasy does any mortal lawyer
dream of such a record.
One ponders. Is the Coast Commission, in fact, some deity in mufti? Do its lawyers
(under three-piece court uniforms) actually wear blue union suits with large red "S"s on
the chest? Is it possible for any lawyer (let alone a single client) to be right 88% of the
time, while the trial judges are almost uniformly wrong?
Berger, You Can't Win Them All - Or Can You? 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1979) (emphasis in
original). The Berger article touched off a storm of controversy within the California bar.
The March/April issue of the California State Bar Journal contained letters to the editor
from well-known lawyers, one pro-Coastal Commission (written by Zad Leavy, a Commis-
sion member) and one pro-Berger (written by Gideon Kanner). Id. at 73 (1979).
94. See, e.g., People v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 45 Cal. App. 3d 185,
119 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1975); Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117
Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974).
95. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). See also Comment,
Aftermammoth: Friends ofMammoth & the Amended California Environmental Quality Act, 3
ECOLOGY L.Q. 349 (1973).
96. Section 21065 was amended in 1972 to follow the Friends ofMammoth interpretation.
See 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 1154, § 17.
97. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
98. Id. at 81, 529 P.2d at 74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
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environmental protection in California, one further objection to zoning
by initiative arises. Planning and environmental protection are matters
of state-wide concern.99 As such, local initiative action should not be
permitted to interfere.' D
III. SAN DIEGO, DUE PROCESS, AND ZONING BY INITIATIVE
A. Hurst and San Diego
Although Hurst was decided on statutory grounds, the supreme
court's decision contained constitutional overtones. Starting with the
premise that the Zoning Act prescribes the measure of a general law
municipality's power to zone, the court warned that the requirement of
notice and hearing contained in the Zoning Act could neither be
treated lightly nor be disregarded.10' The court then noted:
When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a
zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative body
becomes quasi judicial in character and the statutory notice and hearing
then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of due proc-
ess and may not be dispensed with.
02
A number of courts, both in California"°3 and elsewhere,104 had con-
strued this language as requiring notice and hearing in all zoning ac-
tions. In 1974, the California Supreme Court was called upon in San
Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council 5 to decide
99. As to planning, see note 92 supra and accompanying text. See also Concerned Citi-
zens of Murphys v. Jackson, 72 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 140 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1977). As to environ-
mental protection, see notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text. See also Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
100. Friends of Mount Diablo v. County of Contra Costa, 72 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1013, 139
Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1977). See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976) ("We distinguish
those decisions which bar the use of the initiative and referendum in a situation in which the
state's system of regulation over a matter of statewide concern is so pervasive as to convert
the local legislative body into an administrative agent of the state."). See also McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (restriction on statewide inititive as to legislative matters that
are the exclusive domain of the federal government).
101. 207 Cal. at 141, 227 P. at 311.
102. Id. (italics in original).
103. Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973); People's
Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973); Laguna
Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960).
Contra, Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (overruling the above cases).
104. See, e.g., Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. Sup. Ct.
1973); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 277 P.2d 805 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1954).
105. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S.
901 (1976). The companion case to San Diego, Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d
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whether notice and hearing were required constitutionally. San Diego
involved an initiative ordinance that set a thirty-foot building height
limitation within a certain coastal zone. The ordinance was challenged
by several developer groups (BCA).
BCA first contended that a section of the San Diego City Charter
impliedly precluded zoning by initiative. The section provides that
state law shall prescribe the organization and operation of the city
planning commission."0 6 BCA argued that state law required the com-
mission to give notice and hearing concerning a proposed zoning ordi-
nance.107 Because the initiative process does not encompass such a
procedure, BCA contended that the city charter thereby precludes zon-
ing by initiative. The court summarily rejected this argument and held
that the charter provision simply governs the commission's conduct
when that commission is authorized to act under the city charter; the
section in no manner attempts to impinge upon the people's right of
initiative.1
0 8
BCA also contended that the United States Constitution'0 9 requires
notice and hearing before a zoning ordinance may be enacted. BCA
urged that recent decisions of the United States' ° and California"'
225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974), reviewed the substance of the challenged ordi-
nance after deferring to San Diego on the zoning by initiative issue. For a history of the
ordinance, see Deutsch, supra note 24.
106. Article V, section 41(c) of the San Diego City Charter provides that the city planning
commission is to be organized under, and have such powers and duties as prescribed by state
law. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d at 209, 522 P.2d at 572,
118 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65854 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
108. 13 Cal. 3d at 209-10, 529 P.2d at 571-73, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 147-49.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process prohibits states from deny-
ing access to the courts to individuals seeking divorces solely on the basis of their ability to
pay); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (states may not terminate individual welfare
payments without a hearing); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (absent
notice and a prior hearing, prejudgment garnishment procedure violates due process). The
foundation of this rule lies in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950), in which the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires "at a minimum. . . that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing." Id. at 313.
111. In City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d
1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 172, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973), the court emphasized that "ordi-
narily municipalities must follow statutory or charter zoning procedures strictly whenever
they propose a substantial interference with land use, for such procedures are constitution-
ally mandated to insure that private property owners receive due process of law." Id. at 790,
505 P.2d at 1016, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 176. In Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492
P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1973), the court noted:
[I]t is clear that the individual's interest in his property is often affected by local land
use controls, and the "root requirement" of the due process clause is "that an individual
[Vol. 12
ZONING BY INITI TIVE
Supreme Courts establish a general rule that individuals be afforded an
opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant
property interest.
Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner distinguished these decisions
on the ground that they involved quasi-judicial or administrative set-
tings, 112 whereas the enactment of a zoning ordinance is "unquestiona-
bly a general legislative act."" 3 The court cited Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization"4 in holding that it is "black-letter
constitutional law" that notice and hearing are required only in quasi-
judicial or administrative settings and not in legislative settings.1 5
The San Diego court also rejected the contention that zoning legisla-
tion should constitute an exception to the Bi-Metallic rule. First, the
court noted that many other types of legislation affecting property
value do not enjoy any exception. 16 Second, the court observed that
legislation may significantly affect life, liberty and other rights pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment," 17 but that these rights enjoy no
exception." 8 Third, the court relied upon decisions of the United
be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest
• . . justifies postponing the hearing until after the event .... "
Id. at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
112. But City of Escondido did not involve an administrative setting; rather, it concerned
the enactment of a city ordinance regulating the placement of billboards and signs along
freeways in the city. City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, 8 Cal. 3d at 787, 505
P.2d at 1013, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 173. The San Diego court, however, determined that the due
process discussion in City of Escondido was "gratuitously suggested in dictum" and, to that
extent, overruled it. 13 Cal. 3d at 216 n.6, 529 P.2d at 577 n.6, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 153 n.6.
113. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d at 212, 529 P.2d at
574, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
114. 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (cited in San Diego as Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado). Writing for
a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every
one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all
public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes
within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals,
sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights
are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.
Id. at 445.
115. 13 Cal. 3d at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 538, 549, 225 P.2d 905, 911 (1950) ("There is no constitutional
requirement for any hearing in a quasi-legislative proceeding.").
116. As examples, the court cited legislative decisions regarding location of public im-
provements, standards of building, health and safety codes, and level of property tax rates.
13 Cal. 3d at 213, 529 P.2d at 574-75, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
118. The court pointed to trade and professional regulations that limit one's liberty to
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States Supreme Court which hold that legislation affecting the value of
real property is governed by the X8-Metallic principle." 9
Finally, the court distinguished Hurst120 on the ground that it was
based entirely upon statutory interpretation rather than on constitu-
tional grounds.' 2' Since San Diego is a charter city, the statutory re-
quirements do not apply. The court disapproved the due process dicta
in Hurst and the California cases applying it, 122 describing the dicta as
an ambiguous passage which "sowed the seeds of the plaintiffs' present
confusion." 123
A strong dissent, 24 written by Justice Burke and concurred in by
Justices McComb and Clark, attacked the majority's holding, arguing
that the initiative process
affords constitutionally inadequate protection to property owners, and
that the essential demands of due process of law under the state and fed-
eral Constitutions may be satisfied only by a zoning procedure which in-
corporates some provision for notice and hearing in addition to the
minimum opportunities available under the initiative election process it-
self.
125
The dissent's position was premised on an assumption "that the area of
zoning is in a class by itself and presents real and tangible risks of dep-
rivation of private property far beyond those involved in ordinary 'leg-
islative' measures."'
126
Justice Burke also rejected the contention that zoning by initiative
provides, through the election process, safeguards equivalent to those
afforded by the State Zoning Law. 127 Relying on Taschner v. City
Council,128 the dissenting justices claimed that a public debate on the
merits of a proposed initiative ordinance cannot be equated with a dis-
engage in such occupations, and to criminal statutes that regulate "sharp" business practices.
13 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 529 P.2d at 575, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
119. Id. at 214, 529 P.2d at 575, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (citing Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944) and State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875)).
120. Recall that San Diego was decided before Livermore overruled Hurst. See note 12
and text accompanying note 25 supra.
121. 13 Cal. 3d at 215-16, 529 P.2d at 576, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
122. See note 103 supra.
123. 13 Cal. 3d at 216, 529 P.2d at 577, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
124. Id. at 218, 529 P.2d at 578, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (Burke, McComb & Clark, J.J.,
dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 222, 529 P.2d at 581, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Burke, McComb & Clark, J.J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 221-24, 529 P.2d at 580-82, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 156-58 (Burke, McComb & Clark,
J.J., dissenting).
128. 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973), overruledby Associated Home Build-
ers, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
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passionate study, evaluation, and report by a staff of planning experts,
or with the hearings before the planning commission and the legislative
body.' 29 Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that the extent to which
one may be heard in an election will depend too often on the size of
one's purse. 130
B. San Diego and the Administrative/Legislative Distinction
Basing its holding chiefly on the distinction between administrative
and legislative acts, the San Diego majority noted, "It is long settled
law that the enactment of a zoning ordinance is purely a legislative act.
• ..It is to be distinguished from the granting or denial of a variance, a
conditional use permit or an exception to use, all of which call for ad-
ministrative action."'13 1 In theory, the administrative/legislative di-
chotomy requires only a simple test: "[Tihe power to be exercised is
legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it
is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already
adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it." 1
32
But in practice, the test is difficult to apply in the context of zon-
ing. 33 The traditional San Diego approach-that the enactment of a
zoning ordinance is a legislative act-is still considered the majority
view, 134 but increasingly has been criticized as exalting form over sub-
stance. In illustration, consider the following example: 13 A developer
seeks approval to construct a planned development consisting of two
golf courses, tennis courts, clubhouses, 675 condominium units, and
ninety individual lots on land zoned R-l, single-family, single-story
residences. If the developer seeks a conditional use permit, ie., an ex-
ception adopted pursuant to a plan already enacted, the governmental
action is administrative. On the other hand, if the developer (or the
129. 13 Cal. 3d at 223, 529 P.2d at 581, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Burke, McComb & Clark,
J.J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 212 n.5, 529 P.2d at 574 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150 n.5 (citing Tandy v. City of
Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 609, 611, 25 Cal. Rptr. 429, 430 (1962)).
132. Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, 86 Cal. App. 3d 506, 509, 150 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328
(1978) (citing Seaton v. Lackey, 182 S.W.2d 336, 339 (1944)). See also Lincoln Property Co.
No. 41, Inc. v. Law, 45 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234, 119 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (1975).
133. See Ward v. Village of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533-34 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1962)
(Klingbiel, J., concurring).
134. Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-JudicialAction, 33
OHio ST. L.J. 130, 130 (1972).
135. This example is based upon the facts of Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,
492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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municipality or the people through initiative) seeks a zoning change,
ie., a change in the plan itself, the governmental action is legislative.
While the effect of each course of action can be identical, the proce-
dural requirements are radically different. Due process of law requires
that administrative actions include: (1) adequate notice of the basis for
governmental action, (2) a neutral decision maker, (3) an opportunity
to make an oral presentation to the decision maker, (4) an opportunity
to present evidence or witnesses to the decision maker, (5) a chance to
confront and cross-examine evidence or witnesses to be used against
the individual, (6) the right to have counsel present the individual's
case to the decision maker, and (7) a decision based on the record with
a statement of reasons for the decision.' 36 These due process protec-
tions are not required for legislative actions.' 37 But more importantly
the extent of judicial review differs radically as well. Legislative action
is given substantial deference by the courts and will be disturbed only if
the action is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.'38 Administrative
action, on the other hand, is subject to vigilant judicial review. Courts
will review the administrative action to determine whether the adminis-
trative agency's findings support the agency's decision and whether the
evidence supports the agency's findings. 139 In cases in which adminis-
trative action substantially affects fundamental vested rights, the courts
exercise independent judgment. 14
0
Responding to the traditional rule's shortcoming, a number of juris-
dictions now treat zoning amendments that apply to specific property
as administrative action.' 4 ' Thus, in Fasano v. Board of County Com-
136. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499 (1978). See also
Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d
12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
137. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See text ac-
companying notes 114-119 supra. See also the views expressed by Justice Newman in note
163 supra.
138. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); McCarthy v. City of
Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
139. See, e.g., Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, II Cal.
3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,
492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
140. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520
P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974) (courts will use independent judgment if administrative
action substantially affects a fundamental vested right).
141. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1974); Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502
P.2d 327 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1972). See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
426 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1976) (Brennan & Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
Eastlake involved a developer's challenge to a city charter provision requiring a
mandatory referendum on all zoning changes in the city. The Ohio Supreme Court had
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missioners,42 the leading case in this area, the Oregon Supreme Court
noted that it would be
ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing
bodies as legislative acts ....
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific
piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority. . . . On
the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific
piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial au-
thority. .. .
If the Fasano standard were applied to the land use regulatory scheme
in California, it readily would be seen that the general policies laid
down by the legislative body as contemplated by Fasano are those
reached through the planning process. Determination of the permis-
sible use of a specific piece of property through zoning amendments,
subdivision approval, etc., under Fasano would be an administrative
function.
If the courts must continue to rigidly adhere to the administra-
tive/legislative dichotomy in zoning cases, they must in turn recognize
the reality of modem land use control that dictates that a zoning
change is an administrative decision and is therefore entitled to the
protection of due process of law. But perhaps the problem is not with
the application of the San Diego rule, but with the rule itself. The
Fasano approach, like the traditional San Diego approach, does not
clearly classify action that both sets down general policy and then ap-
plies that new policy to specific property. This is the type of action
typically seen in zoning by initiative. It has been suggested that the
accepted the developer's claim that no standards were available to guide the voters. In its
comments on and ultimate rejection of this issue, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger, stated:
If respondent considers the referendum result itself to be unreasonable, the zoning re-
striction is open to challenge in state court, where the scope of the state remedy avail-
able to respondent would be determined as a matter of state law, as well as under
Fourteenth Amendment standards. That being so, nothing more is required by the
Constitution.
Id. at 677.
Because Eastlake involved a referendum situation, not an initiative, there was compliance
with the statutory zoning procedures.
The Eastlake decision has given commentators a field day. See Hogue, Eastlake & Ar-
lington Heights: New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use?, 28 CASE W.L. REy. 41
(1977); Comment, Zoning Change. Mandatory Referendum-A Permissible Reservation of
Power by the People, 23 Loy. L. REv. 243 (1977); Comment, Preserving "The Blessings of
Quiet Seclusion" The Eastlake Decision and a Community's Right to Control Growth, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 895.
142. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1973).
143. Id. at 26.
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proper approach is to balance the private and governmental interests
involved.'" The United States Supreme Court has described this bal-
ancing approach as a three-pronged test, stating:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.'
45
Under this balancing test, zoning by initiative should not survive a
due process analysis. The private interest affected-the right to private
property-is a fundamental one protected by the Constitution. 46 In-
deed, the first item incorporated from the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment was the clause of the fifth amendment 47 that
entitles property owners to "just compensation" whenever a govern-
mental entity takes his or her property. 148 The Supreme Court under-
scored the importance of private property rights and their relationship
to "liberty" in its decision of Lynch v. Household Finance Corpora-
tion: 1
49
iT]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false
one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to en-
joy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak
or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right .... In fact, a funda-
mental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other.'
50
There is a significant risk that zoning by initiative may erroneously
144. The Initiatie, supra note 21, at 92.
145. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation."
Recall also the teachings of the Tenth Commandment: "Thou shall not covet thy neigh-
bor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidser-
vant, nor his ox, nor his ass, or any thing that is thy neighbor's." Exodus 20:17 (King
James). Recall as well in the words of the United States Supreme Court: "[N]o class of laws
is more universally sanctioned by the practice of nations and the consent of mankind, than
laws which give peace and confidence to the actual possession and tiller of the soil." Haw-
kins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 466 (1831).
147. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
148. Chicago B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
149. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
150. Id. at 552.
[Vol. 12
ZONING BY INITIATIVE
and permanently deprive affected landowners of their property rights.
The electorate is not required to ensure that its proposals are consistent
with local planning, nor is it required to consider the environmental
consequences of its action. The property owner becomes simply a voice
in the wilderness left to compete with the sometimes selfish desires of
society in general. He may be left saddled with the burdens of owner-
ship while the initiative action takes away the benefits of ownership.
Often, simply the fight itself is enough to bankrupt the owner.' 5
The remedies available to a property owner who alleges an unconsti-
tutional deprivation or "taking" of property have been described as il-
lusory. 152 Agins v. City of Tiburon 53 holds that inverse condemnation
damages are not available. Selby v. City of San Buenaventura 54 holds
that declaratory relief is not available unless there is a defect in the
proceedings that led to the enactment, i e., a technical defect in the ini-
tiative procedure. What is left is invalidation of the ordinance.
At this point, the parties commence to play what is sometimes called the
Yo-Yo game. If a reviewing court, for example, strikes down a regulation
which permits one residential unit to be built every eight acres, the local
entity on remand may pass a new regulation permitting one unit to be
built every nine acres. If this is also struck down, the entity then enacts an
ordinance permitting one unit for every 12 'acres, or every six acres, or
whatever. Infinite variations are possible. The object of the game is to
exhaust the funds, or the patience, of the owner. The regulators, who may
lose every court clash, nonetheless prevail.1
55
Compliance with the State Zoning Law scheme of hearings, study, rec-
ommendations, etc., would provide at least some safeguards to the
property owner and put him on a more equal footing.
Finally, the burden imposed on government by the statutory scheme
is minimal, especially in comparison to the expense of conducting an
initiative election. At the very least, the administrative and fiscal bur-
dens imposed by the State Zoning Law and the initiative process are
comparable.
151. See Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1978),
affdsub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); Southpark Square, Ltd. v. City of Jackson, 565 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 946 (1978). These cases are representative of many in which a property owner
faced either foreclosure on the subject property, or actual bankruptcy, during the course of
litigation. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 25, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
152. Petition, supra note 151, at 17-26.
153. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
154. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
155. Petition, supra note 151, at 22.
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IV. HORN V COUNTY OF VENTU A: A NEW PROSPECTUS
In Horn v. County of Ventura,'5 6 the California Supreme Court ex-
amined the question of whether due process of law requires notice and
hearing before a tentative subdivision map is approved. In an opinion
by Justice Richardson, it held that the fourteenth amendment 57 does
require notice and hearing. Because of the similarity between the en-
actment of a zoning ordinance under the State Zoning Law and the
procedure used in considering an application for tentative subdivision
map approval under the Subdivision Map Act,158 Horn raises questions
regarding the continued validity of the Livermore and San Diego deci-
sions.
In Horn, property owners challenged Ventura County's approval of
a tentative subdivision map. An application for approval of a tentative
subdivision map is reviewed by local government in much the same
way as are zoning ordinances. The application receives study, recom-
mendations, and hearings, generally before an advisory agency or plan-
ning commission and before the legislative body.' 5 9 Like the State
Zoning Law, the Subdivision Map Act requires the tentative subdivi-
sion map to be consistent with local planning 6 ' and CEQA requires
consideration of the environmental consequences of the proposed sub-
division. 6 '
The court first reaffirmed the administrative/legislative dichotomy
expressed in Bi-Metalic and San Diego'62 but noted its caution in San
Diego that land-use decisions less extensive than general re-zoning
were to be construed as administrative, thereby requiring due process
considerations. 63 The court found that subdivision approvals, like
variances and conditional use permits involve application of general
standards to specific parcels of property, and that government conduct,
156. 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
158. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
159. Id.
160. Id. §§ 66473-66474.
161. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1979).
162. 24 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 596 P.2d at 1137-38, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22 (1979).
163. Id. at 615, 596 P.2d at 1137-38, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722. See San Diego Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 212 n.5, 529 P.2d 570, 574 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146,
150 n.5 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976). In a concurring opinion in Horn,
Justice Newman argued that it was time to reject the administrative/legislative test in its
entirety. Justice Newman warned that "we should not encourage legislators and rulemakers
who conceivably yearn for a more comfortable past-when often they did proceed without
notice, without hearing, in 'protective secrecy'." 24 Cal. 3d at 621, 596 P.2d at 1143, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 727 (concurring opinion).
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affecting the relatively few, is determined by facts peculiar to the indi-
vidual case."6 It was significant to the court that applications for sub-
division are evaluated for their impact on the environment and must be
consistent with local planning; those statutory concerns were precisely
the ones the plaintiff wished to raise.'65 The court concluded:
Resolution of these issues involves the exercise of judgment, and the care-
ful balancing of conflicting interests, the hallmark of the. . . [administra-
tive] process. The expressed opinions of the affected landowners might
very well be persuasive to those public officials who make the decisions,
and affect the outcome of the subdivision process.'
66
Finally, the court found that the notice and hearing procedures uti-
lized were constitutionally inadequate. It rejected the proposition that
the county's procedures for review of environmental impact under
CEQA were sufficient.' 67 The county had posted environmental docu-
ments at central public buildings and mailed notice to persons specifi-
cally requesting the documents. The court suggested that acceptable
methods of giving notice would be to mail notice to all property owners
within a given radius of the subject property, post notice at or near the
project site, or do both.168 Moreover, the court held that the county's
process of reviewing the environmental impact did not constitute an
adequate hearing. The CEQA procedures are intended only to evoke
public response to general environmental concerns and do not guaran-
tee landowners a pre-deprivation hearing on the specifc aspects of the
threatened interference to their property. Thus, the court held that
CEQA procedures failed to satisfy the plaintiff's due process rights.
16 9
The same considerations that led the supreme court to require notice
and hearing in the context of subdivisions apply with equal force to
zoning. Zoning involves the application of general standards to specific
property, based on individual facts. Proposed zoning is subject to re-
view for its environmental impact 70 and must be consistent with local
planning.'7 ' Zoning by initiative might arguably provide constitution-
ally adequate notice, but it clearly does not provide a constitutionally
adequate hearing.' 72 Zoning, similar to subdivision approval, should
164. 24 Cal. 3d at 614, 596 P.2d at 1138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
165. Id. at 614-15, 596 P.2d at 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
166. Id. at 615, 596 P.2d at 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
167. Id. at 617, 596 P.2d at 1141, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
168. Id. at 618, 596 P.2d at 1141, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
169. Id. at 619, 596 P.2d at 1142, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
170. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1979).
171. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1966-1978).
172. See text accompanying notes 124-129 supra.
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be considered an administrative act that requires the protections of due
process of law and land use control procedures provided by statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Zoning by initiative is unworkable. It fails to give effect to important
considerations of planning and environmental protection. Zoning pro-
posals must have the benefit of public hearings and professional study
so that the proposal will be consistent with the environmental and long-
range planning objectives of society. Overall planning would be seri-
ously crippled if the initiative process could be used in this field.
Finally, zoning by initiative fails to adequately protect the constitu-
tional rights of the aggrieved property owner. The Michigan Supreme
Court has described the initiative process and land use matters in the
following manner:
It is the fate of all ideas, good and bad, that some will seek to extend them
to an extreme beyond purpose and reason. It is the duty of the courts, in
their area of responsibility, to guard against that tendency, and to confine
this important reserved right of the people to its legitimate and proper
scope lest, through misuse, it fall into disrepute.
7 3
Gregory A. Hile
173. West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1974).
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